BOOK REVIEW


A century ago G.L. Cheesman (1914) offered the first (and still basic) comprehensive monograph on the auxilia, whose manpower equaled or exceeded the legionaries. As both the conquered in the conqueror’s service and “the blood of the provinces” spilled in combat (Tac. Hist. 4.17.2; cf. Agr. 35.2), they indispensably bolstered Rome’s army and epitomized the expandable citizenship fostering the Empire’s success. Annotated catalogues of units (C. Cichorius, RE 1893, 1900; J. Spaul 1994, 2000, 2002), studies of units in individual provinces1 and chronologically limited surveys (P. Holder 1980, D. Saddington 1982) attest scholarly interest. Continued fieldwork on the frontiers, proliferation of newly discovered military diplomata, and changes in scholarly fashions invited a new discussion. Thus, rather than a synthesis of traditional themes (unit histories, equestrian careers, etc.), Haynes’ new twist to this often not unproblematic material introduces the auxilia to theoretical archaeology, currently a hodgepodge of competing approaches cherry-picked to taste.2 The encounter is not always happy. “Provincial society” in the title best reflects the emphasis. Novel is not study of the auxilia’s integration, but rather Haynes’ view of the processes.3 Many will find much to contest: army specialists, who will frequently recognize Cheesman’s ghost, and others skeptical of archaeology’s theoretical turn. Bibliographical oversights, most notably a 2010 Toronto dissertation, and some curious methodology


raise numerous issues, which a brief discussion can only broach. In offering the first comprehensive study of the auxilia in a century, Haynes’ work, changing the discussion’s direction, invites evaluation of whether “new approaches” better or only differently assess the evidence. A reader’s reaction to this marvelously detailed and nicely illustrated study will probably be based on his/her predisposition to theoretical archaeology.

An “Introduction” (Chapter 1) displays Haynes’ agenda and biases. Material culture, privileged over literary and even epigraphical sources, permits discarding (not necessarily disproving) evidence contrary to the desired theses and seeing otherwise invisible aspects of the auxiliary’s daily life, thus launching an imaginative adventure in history “from the bottom up,” a Lieblingmotiv of the Annales school. Eric Wolf’s now “classic” Europe and the People without History (1982), unknown to Haynes, offers a parallel. Sparse attention to archaeology, according to Haynes, allegedly misled scholars emphasizing epigraphical evidence like Eric Birley, Holder, and Sad Extra. Yet the longevity of units and their transfers to other theaters—thus breaks in the material record at particular sites—mitigate the preference for artifactual evidence, a problem dodged rather than solved through an appeal to units as evolving “communities.” Army units as a “community,” a theme Haynes pursued earlier (1999), draws inspiration from Ramsay MacMullen’s “The Legion as Society”—an offshoot of “face of battle” studies (likewise with Annalist roots), devoted to reconstructing a soldier’s combat experience.6 An old quandary of unit histories persists, however, in the epigraphical record’s inconsistencies for unit names.

Pioneers of auxilia studies (Mommsen, Cichorius, Cheesmen), victims of the Zeitgeist of European empires and believers in “martial races” that a hegemon could exploit, offered now disdained “imperialist,” if not racist (a term not used) views. The currently preferred approach exclusively champions perspectives of the conquered:6 “Correction” of Cheesman’s “error” underlies Haynes’ analysis. Instead

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of re-stocking ethnic units with new recruits from their homeland(s) to maintain tactical specialties, Haynes posits units soon ethnically mixed; any ethnic dress, tactical specialty or weapon was generalized or abandoned, although regimental traditions retained some ethnic characteristics. Thus the auxiliary’s identity evolved within multi-ethnic “communities” subject to the unique cultural dynamics of a specific region and the individual’s military experience. If Cheesman’s Roman parallels in the army of British India can be chastised, Haynes’ acknowledged debt to postcolonial/subaltern studies, i.e., the auxilia as a “third space” between colonizers and colonized, ignores that the origin of subaltern studies (at least partially) lies in British Indian policies, and citing only a single contemporary scholar’s view favorable to Haynes’ argument (113 with n.63) suggests cherry-picking. Despite his attempts to discount continued recruitment of Batavi from the lower Rhine, this acknowledged exception embarrasses Haynes’ thesis.

Throughout, views common to many theoretically inspired archaeologists, often eager to primitivize the army, appear: any notions of uniformity, agency of the central government (no one at Rome scarcely ever made a decision), and Empire-wide trends are shunned for local particularization; change in the provinces reflected “an invisible hand” of local communication and exchange. Denial of a single model for provincial civil-military relations reflects the relativism: assessment of the army as a “total institution” (socially self-contained and isolated from civilians), certainly already refuted for religious and other aspects, is at two points rejected but accepted for Dura-Europos (18–19, 358; cf. 156–57). Readers should be prepared for repetition of such fashionable archaeological terms as landscape and Claude Lévi-Strauss’ bricolage (secondhand use of materials in a new project), a term enjoying a “new life” in contrast to his now passe structuralism.

For Haynes, twenty-five years’ auxiliary service did not aim at Romanization, currently a topic of fiery debate among British archaeologists.7 Again, local context and its variables are determining factors. Haynes follows the “anti-Romanization” school’s denial of a single “Roman” culture, but, tiptoeing around the Romanization debate’s landmines, he rejects the “globalization” interpretation (not defined) for “incorporation” in the technical sense of “embodiment theory,” whereby Roman classification systems integrated auxiliaries into provincial society and permitted them to embody its aspects without eliminating personal choices. Few readers will have the background to appreciate all the subtleties. Saddington had

7 Cuff (supra n.4: 24-34, 197-207, 211-12) defends Romanization.
already posited the auxiliary’s personal choice in the degree of his Romanization.\(^8\) From a broader perspective, however, one wonders if by this reasoning a national culture could have existed at any time or place, whether Roman, American, British, etc. The culture of New York City is not the culture of Gwaw Bone, Indiana. Is any national culture an illusion?

The work is organized into seven parts with continuous enumeration of chapters. Part I (Chapters 2–5) surveys the auxilia’s organization and general history from the Late Republic to the Severans, when the constitutio Antoniniana ended discernment of citizen legions from non-citizen auxilia. Yet the distinction had exceptions: enrollment of cohortes voluntariorum (initially in response to the Teutoburg Forest disaster, 9 CE), recruitment of citizens for auxilia units (especially in the East), and rewards of civitas for valor to whole units before discharge. Sometimes the narrative, blurring the distinction between legions and auxilia, (e.g. 52), treats the army as a whole, not the auxilia specifically.

For the Late Republic through the Julio-Claudians the discussion draws heavily on the work of Lawrence Keppie, Holder, and Saddington. Despite Augustus’ creation of a professional army, replacement of native with Roman commanders progressed slowly. Likewise, naming units for their commanders ceased only around 27 CE. As many legions had Republican origins, skepticism, unjustified given the scanty evidence, denies the same for auxilia. More probably, units already in service continued with others called Augusta added later. Claudius regularized the grant of civitas upon discharge, but his reform of the auxilia’s command structure (the tres militiae) is essentially ignored. If some Augustan units were already subdivided into turmae and centuriae on the regular army’s model, a reader misses how much auxiliary organization was in flux before Claudius. But Haynes, based on too few examples, would like to generalize a lack of standardized internal organization (size of turmae, number of centuriae) to later periods. The evolution of specific ranks is better treated in Saddington’s scattered works.

Haynes follows J.M. Carrié’s notion (41, 99) that Augustus’ creation of a profession army introduced a new distinction of soldier from civilian, a theme later addressed for provincial civilian auxiliary interaction. The view ignores, however, the pomerium’s significance in distinguishing domi from militiae. Rome’s army had always occupied a separate legal sphere with its own rules. Professionalization eventually forged the army’s identity as a distinct interest group with a privileged status,

but it hardly eliminated the legal civil-military distinction, nor did similarities in military and civilian dress change legality (266).

Trajan introduced new ethnic units from culturally less advanced peoples, the *numeris*, whose relationship to the *auxilia* remains controversial. Creation of new units of *numeris* and *auxilia* continued simultaneously, although *numeris* units varied in size, could retain native commanders (e.g. Lucius Quietus and his Moorish cavalry), and had no guarantee of *civitas* upon discharge. Rome’s need to tap “raw talent” and various tactical specialties, the original rationale for the *auxilia* seems obvious. By the Severan era *auxilia* and legions were no longer distinct tactically or in weaponry. The assimilation process, gradual and obscure, was already underway by Trajan’s time. Haynes’ rejection of Cheesman’s view that a century after Augustus the provincials recruited for the *auxilia* had become too “Romanized” for the tasks of *numeris* is unconvincing.

For Antonine and Severan developments Haynes is up-to-date on a new *diploma* qualifying Septimius Severus’ supposed legalization of marriage for serving soldiers, but his enthusiasm for an emerging view of women and children inhabiting Roman forts should be tempered.9 Belts, brooches, and shoes attest status symbols (268–269), but prove little about sleeping arrangements. Discussion of Antoninus Pius’ reform, prohibiting the grant of *civitas* to the current children of discharged auxiliaries, overlooks Peter Weiss’ important paper, which Cuff appreciates in a more extensive discussion including the size of auxiliary families.10 The donative of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus to the Praetorians (*H.A., Marc. 7.9, erroneously cited as Dio 72.32.3*), taken as an appeasement of the army for Pius’ reform, can hardly be more than the new emperors’ customary genuflection to the urban army, as it is not clear that provincial armies always received such donatives.

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Part II (Chapters 6–9) on recruitment embodies Haynes’ detailed attack on Cheesman’s view of re-stocking ethnic specialties, but also rehearses much of his discussion. In a work stressing local particularism, the central government’s role (not emphasized), nevertheless, repeatedly emerges. Augustus decided to create permanent auxilia units and choosing ethnic names for units from the Empire’s own administrative nomenclature makes sense despite its “error” from the conquered’s perspective. Haynes concedes that recruitment was coordinated from the center (125–126). Indeed “files” on individual soldiers had been kept since the Late Republic.11 Hence skepticism that no centralized “lists” of auxilia units paralleled those for the legions (70 n.80) reflects another attempt to primitivize the army. Provincials owed bodies (through conscription) as well as taxes. The Batavi alone escaped taxes through recruits (Tac. Germ.29). But neither taxes nor recruitment was evenly distributed throughout the Empire. Why should they be? Thrace, Pannonia, Gaul (including the Germanies), and Asia Minor were repeatedly mined. Local recruitment only partially satisfied the need for “a few good men,” as veterans retired, and the auxilia like the legions could go far afield to find them. New recruits could bring their own pottery with them despite Haynes’ skepticism (105). A more extensive comparison of auxiliary and legionary recruitment would have clarified the discussion, although weakening the rebuttal of Cheesman. Yet centralized policy also determined where new units were stationed. Newly conquered provinces, such as Spain or Dacia, were heavily recruited for new units subsequently sent elsewhere—an aid to pacification. The few Parthian alae were never stationed in the East before the Late Roman era. Local service of newly raised units ceased with the demands for manpower on other fronts. Haynes (104) admires this “social engineering,” which could also be called strategy, a term anathema to many theoretical archaeologists.

Haynes’ chief assault on Cheesman discounts that ethnic units recruited for tactical specialties, such as Batavian cavalry and Syrian archers, received new recruits from their homeland(s). Eventually local recruitment probably did replace distant restocking, but how soon is unclear. Haynes puts it early rather than later. An effort to marginalize the Batavi is unsuccessful. So many Batavi served in the equites singulares that the ethnic became a synonym for that elite unit, although Batavi never exclusively manned it. Thus singulares not ethnically Batavian could be called Batavi—a point in Haynes’ favor. Yet an attempt to devalue the Batavi’s virtus, the ability in armor to swim broad rivers like the Danube while controlling

their horses, uncritically relies on a laudatory anecdote of Dio (69.9.6), who attributed the feat to Hadrian’s new training regulations. But when in Hadrian’s hectic first year, beset with the collapse of Trajan’s arrangements for Dacia and the Lower Danube—the real cause of Hadrian’s termination of Trajan’s Parthian war—would the emperor or the equites singulares have time for new training? Certainly the anecdote, best dated to 118, must be connected to the Batavian Soranus’ epitaph (ILS 2558), possibly Hadrian’s own composition.\(^\text{12}\) Perhaps Hadrian’s reforms of training later generalized the practice, but for 118 Dio’s Batavians and ILS 2558 surely represent the native Batavian skill that Tacitus noted (Hist. 4.12.3).

Similarly, rebutting Cheesman on the restocking of eastern archer units involves problematic evidence: the few known names and origines of auxiliaries in these units, the tangled web of these units’ histories, and the dates of their creation. Rome’s traditional reliance on allies and mercenaries for archers inspired the auxilia’s archer units. Besides Syrians and other easterners, Thracians and even Batavians brought native skills with the bow. Haynes’ skepticism about specialist skills among non-Roman recruits and a belief that Romans could train archers of equal quality contradict the very rationale for recruiting auxiliary specialists. Quality of the skill, not just the quantity of archers has to be considered. Haynes is naïve about the lifelong training required especially for efficient horsearchers.\(^\text{13}\) Cheesman, based on evidence then available (1914), emphasized the cohors I Hemes Castro- rum sagittariorum equitata, cohors I Augusta Ituracorum sag, cohors I Ituracorum sag eq., and cohors I Augusta Ituracorum sag. Many of these units spent time in Dacia and Pannonia Inferior, where in the Severan era a Syrian “colony” (not exclusively military) prospered, especially at Intercisa. Mainz and its vicinity parallel Intercisa: an enclave of easterners, associated with archer units (Iturai, Parthians, and Arabs), flourished from Augustus into the Flavian era with ample epigraphical attestations of eastern connections.\(^\text{14}\) Balkan evidence for eastern equipment, such as conical

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helmets of presumably Syrian archers (as on Trajan’s Column), is argued away (292–296). For Haynes the eventual assimilation of auxilia included modification of tactical skills for deployment in other postings, but the evidence, the relief from a second-century tombstone in Mauretania Caesariensis not depicting the deceased from a Parthian ala as an archer in Parthian dress, is more problematic than he realizes (288-289).15

Largely using Cheesman’s own evidence against him, Haynes switches the emphasis from the presence of Syrian names to the rarity thereof and appearance of non-Syrians. In the absence of full rosters at any date, arguments derive from chance survivals of inscriptions. A paucity of Syrian names from the cohors I Hemesenorum (at Intercisa from the early 180s) fits a date for the unit’s creation in the 160s rather than Cheesman’s preference for c.100. Yet the few known names for this unit and others essentially create an argumentum e silentio, and Haynes’ skepticism (129–130) about the accuracy of soldiers’ ethnics in their inscriptions would render any argument about ethnicity otiose. Names and ethnicities of officers, equestrians appointed to commands, are irrelevant for ethnics of units’ greges. Extension of the argument, however, to the ala I Augusta Ituraeorum is faulty (139). Thaemus Ituraeus, discharged in 110 (CIL XVI 57), thus recruited c.85, may indeed indicate restocking from the homeland, for (unknown to Haynes) a diploma of 98 (CIL XVI 42) is not the unit’s earliest attestation. It may have been on the middle Danube since c.50–70 (stamps at Solva). Fewalae from Syria (none of Ituraei) were formed after c.70.16 Tentea’s prosopographies of these units, covering three centuries, show a mixture of ethnic names (as expected), but no shortage of easterners.

For Haynes, the raising at Intercisa of both a temple in 201 (ILS9155) and an altar in 214 (AE 1910.133 RUIV 1939) to Elagabalus attests a regimental tradition of venerating Emesa’s chief deity, thus a cult taking root on the Danube when (pace Haynes) few ethnic Syrians remained in the unit. Unknown to Haynes, the unit had built an earlier temple to Elagabalus at Gorsium (198/199: AE 1973.437 bis). A Syrian tradition at Intercisa, however, long antedates the Hemensians’ arri-

15 The relief appears on the second-century stone of Rufinus (AE 1976.746), not that of Silius Catus (CIL VIII 21619, early 3rd c.), which Haynes cites. More could be said about the significance of this relief for Haynes’ argument but not here.

val: the *ala I Augusta Ituracorum*, stationed there 92-101, built the first fort. Nevertheless, the language of the altar’s text, *deo patrio Soli Elagabalo* (lines 6-7) may suggest a real ethnic attachment rather than an “imagined community.” Visits (real or anticipated) of Septimius Severus and Caracalla probably occasioned the temple and the altar respectively. The Severan prosperity of Intercisa, exceptional on the Pannonian frontier, indicates that more was involved than an Emesian unit with few real Syrians.17 Cheesman’s ethnic restocking can be debated, but is not yet disproved.

Part III (Chapters 10–11) addresses the auxiliaries’ integration into provincial life. As well known, some Roman forts spawned urban development. Haynes presents a paradox (100, 153–54): Rome preferred rural recruits but “urbanized” them in cities and forts. Urban situations like Dura-Europos may represent the exception rather than the rule in the Empire as a whole, particularly in view of many isolated auxiliary forts. For forts Haynes perversely equates with cities traits common to any form of collective habitation. Already in the Middle Republic the *castra* served as a *patria altera militaris* (Liv. 44.39.5) with the *vallum* as city walls; in historical texts the theme of the army as a city goes back to Thucydides (6.23.2; 7.75.5, 77.4-5) and Xenophon’s *Anabasis*. Discussion of the auxiliary’s integration includes baths, shaving, military haircuts, multi-purpose use of olive oil, preference for wheat over barley, and distinctions in meat available to legionaries and auxiliaries. If homeland staples were no longer available to auxiliaries in their service postings, ethnic methods of food preparation could be preserved.

Part IV (Chapters 12–14) on religion continues the argument for particularization. The Dura *feriae* is discounted (following Reeves) as a civilian calendar irrelevant to “army religion.” His arguments (200–206) only partially convince. If a ubiquitous *Kaiserkult* is begrudgingly conceded, its specific practices, not centrally dictated, varied locally (208–211). Haynes has missed Stäcker’s important point that pre-Severan imperial statues in army camps were honorific, not religious. Conclusions on civil-military religious interaction resemble Stoll’s and Haynes rightly stresses the diversity of cults within units.18 An attempt to divine soldiers’

17 See Teneta (supra n.14) 49.
personal beliefs from decorations on swords and belts (213–218, 262–263) overlooks their apotropaic use. Cursory discussion of the sigia and the signifer’s animal-skin headaddresses omits their religious context in combat.19

The auxilia spread the worship of Gallic gods like the Campestres, a cult peculiar to the alae, and Hercules Magusanus, both facilitating the incorporation of diverse peoples, but mystery cults like Mithraism are rejected as “military cults.” Haynes finds only five cases of native deities worshipped within an ethnic unit, although many examples are argued away, including the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, considered too ubiquitous for relevance. Yet in Dacia two instances attest a sacerdos imported for this cult to serve active soldiers besides veterans and locals. At Apulum the priest was a Flavius Barhadadi and the equites singulares at Rome in the 160s or later had a Parthian in this role. Eastern ethnicities uncomfortably seem to recur.20

Part V (Chapters 15–18) addresses technical military themes. Arrian’s description of cavalry games in Cappadocia celebrating Hadrian’s vicennalia in 136, the second part of his Tactica, is hailed as “the most dramatic manifestation of the processes of incorporation at work in the auxilia” (239). Yet Haynes’ use of Arrian is problematic. The Tactica’s first part on the organization of an Hellenistic infantry phalanx hardly belongs to a Greek tradition of cavalry manuals (240), nor do the games reflect practices of numeri, absent in the Cappadocian army (286). A bilingual inscription at Trapezus (Arr. Peripl. 2) does not prove that citizens could take an oath to the emperor in either Latin or Greek (302). Nor does an argument (251–252) that socially mobile auxiliaries could rival the elite in personal equipment find support at Arr. Tact. 34.2 (κατ’ ἄξιεν αὐτῶν διαρρήσεις), where cavalry facemasks, worn by the wealthy (pace Haynes) and the particularly skilled, are interpreted as status symbols; officers did not regularly wear them. But ἄξιεν means “rank” (as in officer) not wealth (cf. Tact. 12.4).

Discussion of equipment rehearses well-known themes, such as Roman bor-


rowings from other peoples, framed here as patterns of communication and exchange. Romans modified others’ practices to optimize them for Roman use (Arr. Tact. 33.3). The Gallic origin of much auxiliary equipment reflects the origin of many early units; Rome had copied Gallic equipment since the Early Republic. Haynes accepts Tacitus’ identification (Ann. 12.35.3) of first-century distinctions of legionary from auxiliary equipment. If lengths of surviving gladius (legions) and spatha (auxilia) muddy the difference between the two swords, definition of the auxiliary’s hasta, whether a long thrusting spear (Roman equivalent of the Greek dory) or the hasta amentata (javelin with a throwing loop), is not addressed. For Haynes, ethnic variations in tactics and equipment, tolerated only in the short-lived numeri, soon vanished in the auxilia.

Haynes agrees with some other equipment specialists that no centralized authority dictated dress and equipment (in contrast to haircuts and shaving). Thus the eventual “standardization” of equipment by the third century becomes a chance development from the constant movement of men and units between forts and provinces. Despite some regional variations of arms and equipment, one wonders, given the implied primitivizing, if literary references to an emperor’s improving equipment (e.g. HA, Had. 10.7, cited as 10.3) are not too readily dismissed or argued away. Adaptation of enemy practices, a long Roman tradition, which Arrian (Tact. 44) celebrates among Hadrian’s merits, continued centuries later in the Strategikon (c.600) of the Ps-Maurice, hardly interested in fostering an “imagined community.” Further, Haynes accepts arguments that auxilia were not “cannon fodder” to spare legionary (citizen) blood (Tac. Agr. 35.2).21 Tacitus, however, makes the same assertion about forces from client-kins (Ann. 3.39.2, 14.23.2). Use of auxilia in the first century (despite the possible presence of a few citizens) could well have differed from that of the more developed units of the second and third centuries. Hadrian’s insistence on the use of native battle cries in ethnic units (Arr. Tact. 44.1) suggests an emphasis on ethnic identity, which in 136 may not yet be Haynes’ “imagined community.”

Part VI (Chapters 19–20) treats language skills and literacy. The ethnic mix

of auxiliaries contributed to regional variations in the *sermo castrensis* and the development of local provincial dialects. Much here derives from J.P. Adams’ work on bilingualism. But an assertion (315) that Latin was not the army’s official language cannot be accepted and the retention of tactical commands in Latin as late as the Ps-Maurice is not mentioned. In the East military documents could indeed appear in Greek, but a definition of “military documents” is not offered. Konrad Stauner’s 2004 dissertation on the army’s prolific production of documents escaped notice.22

In Part VII (Chapter 21) on veterans, Haynes argues that auxiliaries, subject to the same local patterns of life and settlement as civilians, neither became agents of Roman culture nor had a significant impact on provincial society. Insufficient data on auxiliary veterans fuel speculative arguments. The lack of a centralized policy on settlement of auxiliary veterans in colonies and auxiliaries’ non-receipt of a discharge bonus (*praemium militiae*) miss the point that Augustus instituted the *praemium* to avoid the responsibility of finding land for veteran colonies. Evidence cited (*Cod. Theod.* 7.20.3.1, CE 326) contradicts Haynes’ view that veterans shunned farming, nor is Nigel Pollard’s view of veterans in developing northern Syrian agriculture as negative as herepresented (360).

A “Conclusion: Embodying Rome” (Chapter 22) rehearses the case for embodiment theory and stresses via the Thracians, numerous in Septimius Severus’ *equites singulares*, provincial influence on the *Urbs*. Much here is new and errors riddle the final chapter (e.g., citations for Thracians in the *equites singulares* 377–378 with n.33). For the supposed martyrdom under Trajan of Clement of Rome at the hands of Roman troops, Haynes follows (369) a late Christian tradition situating the execution in the Crimea, where no Roman forces were yet stationed. Yes, the Principate should be judged not as a conservative but a dynamic and evolving era (381), although all historical periods reflect change in some form.

Haynes’ new look at the auxiliaris invites debate and must be read critically. Caveat lector. Numerous erroneous ancient citations and occasional misrepresentations of views in secondary literature require checking the sources cited. An incredible number of misspellings of non-English words and names (e.g., van Crefeld for van Creveld, 341, 392) suggest that OUP should be added to the so-called “prestige presses” that no longer care about accurate proofing and editing.

REVIEW OF Haynes, *Blood of the Provinces*