BOOK REVIEW


This festschrift volume for Waldemar Heckel comprises twenty essays on a variety of topics clustered around the military and cultural contexts of the kings of Macedonia, especially Philip II and Alexander III. This diverse volume reflects Heckel’s broad interests with no editorial introduction to the essays themselves. The forward (Lawrence Tritle) and introduction (J.C. Yardley) discuss Heckel’s career, scholarly contributions and offer personal reminiscences. I will not offer a detailed discussion of each paper here, but I will discuss two groups of essays that I found particularly stimulating: those using theories developed in other disciplines and those addressing historiographical concerns.

Several of the papers in the volume use modern military theories to illuminate problems of ancient warfare. Lee L. Brice (“Military Unrest in the Age of Philip and Alexander of Macedon: Defining the Terms of Debate”) introduces a typology of military unrest to clarify our thinking about military discipline and its breakdown in the ancient world. He uses ancient examples to illustrate four types of unrest (military conspiracy, mutiny, expression of grievances and insubordination) along with their aims, participants, and mode of action. His typology is compelling, but immediately problematized by Joseph Roisman’s paper (“Opposition to Macedonian Kings: Riots for Rewards and Verbal Protests”).

Roisman examines how the Macedonian monarchy responded to opposition in the form of rioting for rewards and verbal protests. His paper stresses the informal manner in which Macedonian kings responded to this opposition but that the ability of the kings to ignore these protests sometimes acted to escalate opposition. One of Roisman’s major examples is the army of Philip V which violently rioted in Corinth to articulate their demands for a more equitable division of booty (Polybius 5.25). This example falls between (non-violent) expression of grievances and (violent) mutiny in Brice’s typology; a surmountable problem for
Brice’s model, but one that highlights a general lack of dialogue between the authors in the volume.

These potentially productive approaches in turn raise questions about the methodology of theoretical interdisciplinarity. E. Edward Garvin (“Clausewitz and Ancient Warfare”) uses the Ionian Revolt, the Sicilian Expedition and Xerxes’ invasion of Greece as case studies to test the applicability of the Clausewitzian theories of Center of Gravity and Cumulating Point of Attack. He then argues that Alexander’s familiarity with the workings of the Persian court allowed him to identify Darius III’s personal relationships as the Clausewitzian Center of Gravity on which the success of his campaign depended and that Alexander’s diversion against Egypt acted to shift the effective “home” of his campaign east, extending his ability to campaign against Darius.

Edward M. Anson’s contribution (“Counter-Insurgency: The lesson of Alexander the Great”) relates Alexander’s campaigns to 21st-century counter-insurgency strategies to deter and combat local resistance. Anson provides a narrative of Alexander’s activities which demonstrates that it was only where Alexander failed to follow these techniques that significant local resistance developed. These two papers demonstrate quite different ways of integrating modern theories with ancient material. Garvin’s paper focuses on the theory, shows its application to several ancient cases, then makes an argument about the particular case of Alexander, whereas Anson’s paper touches on the body of theory only briefly in the text and references and leaves the application of the theory mostly implicit in his narrative. Both papers provoke questions of the circularity of using theories developed from military history to illuminate that history. This question is beyond the scope of these papers, but in Anson’s case a deeper explicit discussion of the theories being transferred would help to alleviate such concerns in the reader.

The papers in this volume make wide-ranging historiographical contributions. A. B. Bosworth re-examines Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian Expedition (“Thucydides and the Failure in Sicily”), in particular Athenian decisions in support of the campaign. According to Bosworth, these decisions were driven by a fear that Athenian upper-class factionalism would spill into the army generally, but Thucydides suppressed the details because of his own membership in that class. Gordon Shrimpton (“The Callisthenes Enigma”) addresses the paradox of Callisthenes’ later reputation for deifying Alexander with his death resulting from association with a conspiracy reacting against Alexander’s wish to be deified.

Stanley M. Burnstein reexamines the Satrap Stele set up at Buto in 311 as evidence of Ptolemy I’s activity on the Nubian border of his kingdom (“Alexander’s
Unintended Legacy: Borders"). He argues that attempts to locate Ptolemy’s campaign in Syria were misled by later Ptolemaic propaganda seeking to portray Ptolemy II as the first to campaign in Nubia. Philip De Souza (“Polybius on Naval Warfare”) examines Polybius’s background, knowledge, and methodological practices for describing naval warfare. He argues that despite Polybius’ relative lack of personal naval experience, his careful source evaluation makes him a valuable reporter on naval battles.

Daniel Odgen (“What did Arsinoe tell Lysimachus about Philetaerus”) connects Strabo’s account of Philetaerus (13.4.1), the eunuch ruler of Pergamum, to the fictive traditions surrounding Seleucus by way of the trope of the loyal administrator whose anticipatory auto-castration exonerates him from accusations of disloyalty. Timothy Howe’s “Arrian and ‘Roman’ Military Tactics. Alexander’s campaign against the Autonomous Thracians” compares Arrian’s tactical works to his treatment of Alexander’s battle against the “Autonomous Thracians” to show how Arrian’s composition relied on his own military experience. Several of these historiographical contributions underscore the deliberate, creative and selective compositional methods of ancient historians.

Beyond these highlighted clusters are essays on the development of Macedonian military units and tactics (William Greenwalt, Graham Wrightson, Carolyn Willekes), on Macedonian officials (Alexander Meeus, Elizabeth Baynham), on aspects of Macedonian kingship and elite life (Guiseppe Squillace, Franca Landucci Gattinoni, Elizabeth Carney), and the two most chronologically disparate articles, on Persian pretenders (Sabine Müller) and the Roman annexation of Macedonia (John Vanderspoel).

Greek, Maced and Persia provides papers on a mix of topics of broad interest to historians of the Macedonian kingdoms. It will be of particular interest to scholars of Macedonian prosopography and military history of Alexander’s campaigns and to those interested in the use of interdisciplinary theoretical methodologies.

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