

**REVIEW ESSAY**

*Sight and the Ancient Senses*. Edited by MICHAEL SQUIRE. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. Pp. xiii + 313. Paperback. \$49.95. ISBN 978-1-84465-866-4.

*A Cultural History of the Senses in Antiquity*. Edited by JERRY TONER. Bloomsbury Academic London, Oxford, and New York. 2014 reprinted 2016. \$95.00. Pp. xiv + 266. ISBN 9780857853394.

Seeing has dominated ways of human perceiving phenomena since the so-called “Presocratics”—sight is the tyrant of all the senses, as Plato perceived the problem and arguably reinforced it. Heraclitus (DK 22 B101a) opined, without known contradiction, that “the eyes are more reliable witnesses than the ears,” Herodotus’ Lydian Candaules echoed the sentiment, and Aristotle confirms this inclination (*On the Soul* 3.3). We trust sight, even though we recognize that eye-witnesses have different ways of seeing as well as different viewpoints. Images and memories are treacherous: the more they tell you, the less you know (paraphrasing the Manhattan photographer Diane Arbus).

These two books explore how Greeks and Romans conceptualized all five senses and awarded primacy to sight and the seen in both theory and experience. Visuality anchors Squire’s volume and permeates Toner’s. A review-essay can gauge the present status of the “perceptive turn” in ancient studies, one that closely follows the “affective turn,” a spate of volumes directing recent attention to the range and role of emotions in constructing ancient personal and social life. A book on one sense, obviously, digs deeper into that avenue of experience than a book on five (neither, unfortunately, mentions intuitional “insight” or extra-sensory perception as a possible sixth sense). A book on all the senses advantageously may call attention to sensory interrelationships such as a beloved’s voice, odor, visual attractiveness, and skin-feel: what you see is not always what you get. Classicists’ attention to the emotions (a contested notion) has freed itself only in this young twenty-first century from the edifying but constrained and constraining influential discussion in Aristotle’s *Rhetorics*. The senses as an object of research is more recent yet, as the two collective bibliographies demonstrate. Previous attention to ancient bodies and sexuality from literary and archaeological evidence naturally

and logically guided scholars to novel attention to histories of recoverable, lived experience.

Because of this faith in sight, we have trouble believing that “past looking” and “ancient being seen” may have been different, in both assumptions and social consequences. At the other, pleasurable end of the sight spectrum, lover and beloved mingled gazes in a “sort of corporeal copulation”. In myth, Medusa, Oedipus, and Narcissus narratives, not to mention Actaeon’s voyeurism and Polyphemus’ blinding (Jonas Grethlein, Lyndsay Coe, in Squire), focalize the eye’s powers and jellied vulnerability. Medusa “statue-ified” and aestheticized (in Ovid, anyway) “her victims into their own macabre funerary monuments” (Susanne Turner, in Squire, 160). Squire collects thirteen essays and provides a far-reaching introduction, the third contribution in Routledge’s series “The Senses in Antiquity.”<sup>1</sup> Those engaged in the “sensory turn” welcome growing attention to the primary sense of the ancient (and modern) sensorium.

Different ecofacts and more limited exposure to different cultures led ancient Hellenic, Italic, and ancient Jewish audiences to experience stimuli otherwise from those in the age of Google (and don’t forget barely perceptible Etruscan and Carthaginian sensibilities). Perhaps *Fellini Satyricon* (1969), especially its acoustics, its harsh sounds, musical and conversational, enters into those ancient sensory worlds. Many are *The Ways of Seeing*, as John Berger taught us (1973; in neither bibliography). Our culturally shaped “intuitions” about sense and emotion too often ignore the blood that ancient ghosts quietly demand.

Both volumes under review belong to a “Senses” series. Toner’s volume addresses nine topics that it shares with five chronological successors. It surveys ancient Greek and Roman cultures with some attention to early Christians. After the editor’s introduction discussing the maintenance of boundaries among social groups (2), nine chapters address various roles of the senses in places, written genres, and disciplines. Series Editor Constance Classen conceived a uniform set of nine topics for each volume surveying Western cultures, but some of the absences (e.g. rural life, political life) seem odd. Thus, “authoritative,” her bold adjective for the series, seems excessive (11). Toner’s collection, in contrast to Squire’s, investigates the entire five-faceted repertory of sensory experience and

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<sup>1</sup> Other books out already feature synesthesia (Shane Butler and Alex Purves, eds., London and New York 2013) and smell (Mark Bradley, editor, London and New York 2015). Volumes on sound, taste, and touch are forthcoming.

the interplay of senses. On the debit side, it attends Roman experience and sources disproportionately to the Greek. It lacks color illustrations, disconcerting in a volume on visual apprehension. Mark Bradley, however, in his essay on the artistry of bodies and stages, discusses the chromatic contribution to cosmetics and clothes, polychrome two- and three-dimensional statuary, and colors that communicate personal status.

Squire's introduction reminds us that sight was the most fully theorized sense for use in control of others and for its controversial workings. Did the eye send out particles that bounced back (extramission, e.g. Plato) or did surfaces send out particles that struck the eye as *eidola* (intromission, e.g. Democritus), or was there a combo (e.g., Aristotle, all discussed in Andrea Nightingale's contribution)? Four essayists address ancient, scientific-philosophic speculation about the "hapticity" or "tacticity" of ancient sight and scientific optics: Kelli Rudolph, Andrea Nightingale, Reviel Netz with the editor, and Mark Smith. While only two other chapters have "theory" in their titles, most eventually address how ancients conceived sight. Contributors examine visual arts, the arguable invisibility of the dead, and the obscure afterlife of the science of ancient optics. The book includes eleven welcome color plates (for Jeremy Tanner on *skenographia* and *skiagraphia*) and numerous (62) figures. Elucidation of verbal sight theories overwhelms study of gazes and visions in specific texts (including material images).

Theater, starting from its etymology, privileged what could be seen and only imagined what one might disgustedly smell (Philoctetes' foot) or taste (Thyestes' *plat du jour*). Ceramic penises with eyes (Squire, fig. 1.9) and eyes painted on cups (fig. 4.7, 6.9) insist that the eyes have it. (The authors delight in paronomasia and catachresis, although not this example.) Eyes have agency, power to bewitch—and they provide openings to victimization, passive windows into the soul. Even Plato's vividly metaphorical allegory of the Cave paradoxically depends on visual images. But eyesight too is fallacious, nothing more fallacious, according to Seneca (NQ 1.3.9, quoted at 19). Here are some specifics.

Rudolph pursues the analogies of "Presocratic" Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus, as filtered through Theophrastus' *On the Senses*, and later, less knowledgeable sources. In this light (or shadow), Greek thinkers seem as concerned with the deficiencies or illusions of visual perception of reality as they are with what's out there. How does a two-dimensional surface (the retina, a stage

“scene,” a painted panel or mural) transact or give the impression of three-dimensional space? Does perception ever lead to reliable knowledge (53)?

Nightingale reprises dark Democritus, summarizing scanty fragments of a possibly once detailed account of a theory of intromission (atoms enter the eye). Plato’s extramissionary (eye emits rays) account struggled to explain the immaterial soul’s connection to the material realm (57 with note 13). He describes the “really real” by delusional visual images through a “rhetoric of estrangement.” He posits that disincarnate Forms are more real than rocks, trees, and one’s children’s diapers. The True Philosopher will blind himself to earthly things and beings (except sometimes beautiful boys).

Nightingale’s Aristotle left a confused, or at least undecodable, “impossible to resolve” account combining both “-missionary” positions, but he is admirably unPlatonic when appreciating nature’s handiwork in, say, organizing the “ugly” inner organs of animals. Like Plato’s censured passer-by Leontius (*Rep.* 439–40), he is fascinated by the disgusting (*Part. An.* 645a, page 65). The investigator thinks it childish to recoil from the beautiful natural world and serious attempts to understand it. This efficient chapter levels its three thinkers as none any better than the rest: each theory works for its author’s system.

Reviel Netz and Michael Squire review the mathematicization of reflection and refraction, elements of optics proper. Archytas, Archimedes, and Ptolemy developed an obscure ancient sub-field. The authors’ pessimistic survey of this area devalues analysis of Democritus’ view of viewing given the sparse surviving sources, as “little more than guesswork” (76, note 25). Netz and Squire perceive ancient vision theories as “combined ambition and failure to make a lasting contribution” (69). That sources often survive only in Arabic and Latin translations and summaries—or Latin translations of Arabic translations—ambushes investigation of Hellenic originals. The mathematicians of optics and philosophers of vision with ideas about light talked past each other. The authors wish to provoke (81, note 39; 82), but few Classicists have formed any opinion about their arcane topic.

Grethlein thankfully examines specific painted sighted figures, what they portray and their mute reflections on the thematics of sight. Starting from interpretation of eye cups, Grethlein cleverly turns to the blinding of Polyphemus and the petrifying gaze of gorgons, including Medusa. Both uncoincidentally appear on the proto-Attic Eleusis amphora (fig. 4.5): the viewer safely looks at two

mythical creatures whose stories and iconography hinge on sight and its annihilation (96). Heroic Perseus can look on Medusa only via an intermediary object (water or shield), as mortal Athenian beholders saw her only via a vase, *vel sim*. Grethlein too quickly dismisses reasonable concerns that such playful reflexivity might be anachronistic for his early period.

Tanner looks at “pictorial poetics,” successful deceptions by mimesis (cf. *Dissoi Logoi* 3.10; Plat. *Rep.* 602d: witchcraft!). This would include the optical refinements of the Parthenon, where the fatter parts make the column shafts look straight (*entasis*). Scenography contributed to the “illusionary poetics of [Attic] tragedy” (114, part one), and *skiagraphia* contributed to the triumphantly mimetic “realism” of Macedonian tomb-painting (part two). Plato, however, employed this term, “shadow-painting”—a contemporary advance—, to describe shams and frauds, indeed, “every kind of sloppy thinking and dangerous deception” (115).

Praxagora’s lamp in Aristophanes’ *Assemblywomen* kick-starts Ruth Bielfeldt’s study of “Sight and Light.” The revolutionary’s apostrophe to her clay lamp’s presence during “Brazilian waxing” and stealing “the liquor of Bacchus” treats the fictile utensil as “half-creature, half-thing,” moreover, a microcosm of the cosmic sun, source of light. Many lamps were round (with a phallic nozzle), a *kuklos* like the sun itself. Praxagora’s lamp is friend and companion, a comic treatment with paratragic vocabulary of “togetherness,” often fostered by the enabled sense of sight (141). Susanne Turner penetrates beliefs about “Seeing the Dead.” Burial rituals, keepsakes, and tombs give the departed “new forms of visibility” (143), forms that evolved over time. Archaic Athenian funerals had drawn too much attention, while Roman intergenerational, funerary processions showcased and “presentified” the recently departed by ancestor masks, while erasing the identity of the marchers. Her insightful essay concludes that “commemoration mobilizes representation to disavow physical absence.”

Verity Platt, like many authors here, starts from an object, here a second century Algerian centurion’s inscription that boasts of surveilling naked nymphs—delusive or real vision, elusive epiphany, dream, visual representation, or peeping Tom at the local baths, *Aquae Flavianae*? Everyone knew what nymphs should look like, but visualizable rarely meant visible. The boast— one of the sergeant’s several—yearns for acute proximity to the divine while remaining vague

about actual fulfillment. Homer already noted that gods are hard to discern on the ground (*Il.* 20.131, *Ody.* 13.312-13).

Jas Elsner and Squire review Roman mnemonics, a very visual recall system. The ancient rhetoricians here give practical advice: “Cicero” of *ad Herennium*, Cicero, and Quintilian. Visualization, the present authors argue, would also aid useful associations for visual artists who could expect elite audiences to have stored up their imaginations with verbal and visual images of (say) the standing hunter at rest (192) or the seated, nude boy, and then repeat and vary a limited repertoire that cashes in on the “cultural memory-bank” (*loci*). Ruth Webb also leans on ancient rhetoric to explain the pragmatics of ancient visual art—how it evoked emotional and cognitive responses. Quintilian (*Inst. Or.* 6) explains how to harness and manipulate listeners’ emotions by speech, complete with examples, but all genres of ancient literature sought vividness (*enargeia*), as Webb notes. The writers Lysias and Augustine and everyone in between, want readers and hearers of texts to feel that they are present at the scene—virtual proxemics. Make your listeners be spectators (as [Longinus] recommended).

Paul claimed to have seen the risen Christ. This autopsy—“the most frequently narrated episode of seeing in the Christian scriptures” (221)—was significant for his authority. Epiphanic seeing was not new. Hellenistic Judaism and its offshoot Christianity appropriated Hellenic discourses of seeing elusive divinities. Jane Heath closely studies moments of Jesus-recognition, observing that the tantalizing vision depends on “instability between presence and absence” (223). An “ocularcentric” epistemology privileged eyewitnesses to Jesus’ resurrection. Through the *Acts of Paul and [his lovely disciple] Thecla*, Heath shows how Christian apologists transformed heathen eroticism into spiritual love, equally obsessional. Thecla, thrown naked to ferocious seals (!) became, through God’s grace and a low cloud, invisible to lubricious Anatolian onlookers. Christianity’s rhetoric of inversion delighted in repeating “You were blind, but now you can see.” Jesus made a blind man see (*Matt.* 9:27-30), in several stages, and the Gospels intend to share his insights. A chapter on sight and blindness in the Hebrew Bible would have nicely complemented this essay, but publishers limit editors’ pages in compilations.

Coo examines the mythic, punitive blinding of the poet Thamyris (comparing equally sightless Homer, Demodocus, and Teiresias, *inter alios*). The

Greek pattern associates insight and self-revelation with loss of sight—even for the oaf Polyphemus (242). Frequent tragic blindedness (a list: note 19) and iconographic conventions have a metatheatrical dimension, since sighted characters (and their tragic actors) cannot acknowledge the theater-goers before them. Blind men depicted on vases draw attention to optical illusions of two dimensions and the creative process of viewing.

Mark Smith surveys the “Afterlife of Ancient Optics” from the third to seventeenth century, how Arab thinkers of tenth-century Baghdad, including al-Farabi and Avicenna, worked out “the Platonized Aristotelian model of visual perception” (253,) and how that tradition passed to the Latin West (Roger Bacon), before Kepler, Huygens, and Newton moved optics from philosophy to mechanistic scientific theory. This chapter too requires previous acquaintance with its issues. Most of the authors build on their previous publications on ancient vision, as the bibliography makes clear. This expertise is a good thing, but notes that casually refer to the authors’ previous monographs insufficiently position the reader to appreciate the learning behind short essays. Such shorthand may not bother readers already expert.

Turning from the privileged sense of sight in Squire’s collection to “a cultural history” inclusive of five paths of perception, Toner’s introduction reviews modern access to how ancient persons sensed their environments. Toner’s team of ten other scholars addresses nine topics. The editor has published on Roman popular culture and supplied a chapter on Christian odors in Bradley’s previously mentioned volume about “smell.” He describes how arbiters of Roman taste established parameters of Roman do’s and don’ts for elite culture (5)—spaces where the *faex Romuli* were not welcome. This reviewer would welcome a volume on ancient proxemics—and others on chronemics and tactemics—the human experience, varying by culture, of the self in space, time, and touch in its environs. Toner introduces sensory stereotypes, foul-mouthed parasites and prostitutes; or the color, exotic sights, and noise of Roman games (300 vermilion ostriches [15]). While the amphitheatric spectacles positioned authority figures to strut their stuff, they also provided a platform for lesser statuses to express discontent by sight and sound: extravagant clothes, synchronized hissing and clapping, or a “mullet” hairstyle (Procop. *Anecd.* 7.8, cited 17).

David Potter surveys feasts (funeral, imperial, and self-celebratory) and funerals in classical antiquity. Sight becomes least important when in the presence of the Emperor. The masses could see him in the circus, but only the privileged could hear his voice, share his food, smell his perfume, and many fewer yet could touch him. Potter's insightful essay flits about Greeks and Romans, touching philosophy, social history, art, excessive consumption at table from Aristophanes to Suetonius. The nonverbal behaviors of the emperors, from Caesar's near-crowning to Diocletian's doffing of the purple in 305 CE (29), provided weighty visual status spectacles and cued audiences into expected reactions. "Large-scale activation of [attractive] scent" flavored urban spectacles at funerals and in theaters and amphitheatres. Potter admirably includes evidence from epigraphy that escapes many contributors to both volumes.

Gregory Aldrete, examining pleasures and offenses of sensory experience, sniffs the stench of ubiquitous human excrement in Roman urban "Opulence and Ordure." The one-per cent, therefore, layered themselves with good scents when they left home, and Nero's men sprinkled the streets with perfumes for his triumph (Suet. *Nero* 25.2)—one of those sensory bonuses translated from the Hellenistic Kings to Italy (e.g., Athen. *Deipn.* 195-6). Andrew Wallace-Hadrill explores evidence for the Eastern luxury trade in tastes and smells in imperial Rome, much of it, including aromatic frankincense and pepper, culled from the disapproving Pliny's *Historia Naturalis*. The government appreciated the tax revenues. Pearls, see-through silk, polychrome marbles, and purple murex evoke touch and sight. No audio imports gain mention, not even the screechy oriental slaves of Petronius' omnivorous and sensual consumer, the freedman Trimalchio.

Susan Harvey queries the functions of the senses in ancient Greek and Roman poly- and monotheisms. Touching cult statues (like those of Roman Catholic saints and virgins) increased some parties' sense of security. The emperor or holy man could heal by touch. Sacrifice, the basic human initiative toward the divine, was sweetened by oils, perfumes, and herbs, both to suggest divine presence and to suppress stink of blood and butchered cattle. Beyond modest self-denial, St. Theodore of Sykeon (*Life*, ch. 20, cited p. 20) emerged from two years of self-mortification in a cave with matted hair, worms lodging in it, pus and sores on his head, emaciated and stinking. "No one could stand near him"—proxemics again. Christianity inverted "cultural sensory codes" (108). Christians reveled in smelly,



disgusting deaths of persecutors and heretics. Arius allegedly drowned in his own dysentery, Galerius of a worm-infested, ulcerated bladder and bowels.

Ashley Clements interprets the same philosophers and scientists who dominate Bradley's "sight" volume: Democritus has more than five senses and those give only "dark knowledge (B11 DK). "Shadowy" Heraclitus and vatic Parmenides explained obscurely, before poetic Empedocles expounded how Aphrodite crafted the fiery "limb" of the eye and its passageways (B84 DK). Plato recognized that the senses' "perceptibles" can at least serve the soul's "intelligibles," with proper training (133). Clements attempts further to summarize Hippocratic perception theories and eclectic Galen's in twenty-two pages, before his postscript on the "Cyrenaics' [extra-sensory] "inner touch," Aristotle, and Beyond." The difficult chapter jams too much material into its allotted limited territory.

Helen King and the editor tackle the senses in medical practice: "Humours, Potions, and Spells." This chapter remedies one lacuna of Squire's volume. Symptoms are confusing, diagnosis and proper treatment difficult, employing the ancient tools available. Galen still follows Hippocratic procedures: listening to chest noises, evaluating urine color, tasting sweat, smelling breath and feces, and touching for temperature and pulse (144). These last three pre-modern diagnostics are now rather downplayed. Look sagacious for patients and their families. Apply remedies (including dung therapy and spitting on the patient), or/and bleed. If one could not afford or find a doctor, or even before, visit and sleep at a shrine of Asclepius, apply a folk remedy. Last, or first, seek magical assistance, disorient daemons with "sensory aggression." If your horse falls ill, consider the possibility of an "evil eye" (*O. Florida* 15) or demoniac possession.

Silvia Montiglio examines the data of the Greek novel for descriptions of the senses when the protagonists fall in love. Smell and touch, more so taste, make only "timid appearances" in the five complete texts. Compared to seeing and hearing, and despite eventual touch, the lower, more intimate senses fare poorly even in the climaxes. Longus' novel is exceptional in this respect: the emphasis on nature in the pastoral genre enabled greater sensualism. In ecphrasis, how sweet Ariadne's breath appears, suggesting odors of apples or grapes, Philostratus' narrator notes (*Imag.* 1.15.3). The erotics of smell call for different comparands than our contemporaries offer (cf. Patrick Süskind's *Parfum*). The Greek novel's focus on the arousal of love, given social conventions, elicits more seeing and hearing than

intimate sensations—except in dreams (170). Thus, love at first sight, not first smell.

Starting from Philostratus' *ecphraseis*, Bradley examines four topics of sensory art history: painted sculptures (always garish to modern taste, whether *korai* or martial Augustus), bodily adornment (clothes, perfumes, cosmetics, etc., admired and deprecated by Ovid and Martial), sensory titillation on stage (music, many masks—44 listed in Pollux), royal costume colors, persuasive voices), and sensual amenities in public life, such as cooling Roman fountains, shaded colonnades, gardens with flowers and trees, and *kosmesis* of swampy Campus Martius. Bradley wisely envisions transcending the “visual paradigm” for an archaeology of all the senses (185).

Benjamin Stevens queries four “sensory media,” how sense perceptions were conveyed in the too easily assimilated world of ancient literature. Sensual Helen in *Odyssey* 4 enters and stimulates all senses. Helen's anodyne potion dulls painful memories and simultaneous sensations. Sense deprivation introduces an unfamiliar element to a study of the ancient senses. Socrates in Plato distrusts the senses, compared with intellection, but, in the setting of the *Phaedrus*, ironically finds delight in its “lovely, secluded spot”: fragrant flowers, cool shade, and chorus of cicadas. Horace *Odes* 1.9 on Soracte engages the senses. Aeschylus' Agamemnon's telegraphic signal system turns the watchman (not, however, stationed at Thebes!) into a receptor machine. Only one sense is active: sight. Stevens apprehends that miscommunication is thematic in the *Oresteia*. He introduces proprioception (216), one's self-awareness of body in life's sensory bath, but he should discuss ancient awareness of such self-bodily experiences.

Both books repay reading for chapters connected to one's research period, author, or topic. Squire's advantage is to focus attention on select aspects of one sense. Toner's advantage is to examine all the senses and their social interactions. His contributors' illumination is necessarily less focused, but readers stroll the entire sensory forest of experience in each chapter.

What might scholars sensitive to the sensory turn find next? The so-called “spatial turn” in literary studies and the human sciences nourishes the “sensory turn” in Classical Studies. Inside and outside, private and public, imprisoned or footloose in the forum or on country roads, liminal passages and boundaries are concepts that depend on the five senses. Archaeology, topography, literary and gender studies, and historical geographies illuminate attention to the senses in

different rural and urban, swampy and desert contexts on Sappho's Lesbos, Lysias or Sophocles' Athens, Seneca's Rome, Apuleius' Thessaly, and Heliodorus' Egypt.

Such collections, impressively broad, reflect different specializations of the contributors, but lack the balance of authoritativeness (as my own experience as editor has proven) and comprehensive coverage. Editors seeking desiderated breadth supplicate specialists who have other priorities and so introductions must gesture towards missing topics. For example, ancient conceptions of viewing processes produced frightening consequences, intended or not, such as pregnant women's "maternal impression" (see M. Reeve, "Conceptions," *PCPhS* 1989), or the assaulting even paralyzing gendered gaze (poor Sappho and Catullus), and dread *baskania/fascinatio*, the Evil Eye.

The topic of the eye as subject, as tool of domination, is here understudied.<sup>2</sup> Autopsy was deemed essential by some historians (Thucydides, Polybius) and certainly valued in Attic and Roman legal adjudications, but neither historiography nor oratory gains foothold. Two-dimensional images (vases, theatrical backdrops, and murals) gain intense attention but not three-dimensional statues or architecture. Similarly, the topic of "love at first *sight*" surfaces only in Silvia Montiglio's valuable chapter in Toner's collection. Eye problems impacted many folk in antiquity, but no essay examines ophthalmic epigraphy, or clay models of eyes at Epidaurus, or medical texts concerned with diminishment of sight, eye infections, or blindness. The eyes are symptomatic. Bloodshot eyes and squints, like stools and urine and sweat, can aid prognosis of other ailments (Hipp. *Epid.* 3). Helen King and Toner's chapter on ancient medicine mention these topics, but their emphasis concerns humoral theory and spells.

To encourage wider engagement with eye-lore and ancient sensory practices, not to criticize, I note two neglected opportunities for reflection on the senses' social roles: local visual emphases and blind-spots as well as the power of images. Spartans, for example, were trained to be parsimonious in words but eager

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<sup>2</sup>Squire's introduction glances at such bewitchment, but his generous bibliography lacks the venerable Frederick Elworthy's charming and fascinating *The Evil Eye* (London 1895) and Y. Yatromanolakis' article (in R. Beaton, ed., *The Greek Novel*, London 1988) on Heliodorus' use of this menacing magical weapon. F. Huxley, *The Eye* (London 1990) explores cross-culturally other mythic powers of the eye such as the eye of god, the seer, and the dragon.

to put on public non-verbal displays. Thus, in charades and parades, they marched their various inhabitants. Spectacles included naked and armed men flashing manliness and strength, or virility's putative absence (men chosen for exclusion as confirmed bachelors or cowardly "tremblers"). Naked maidens processed to suggest nubility (women available in the Spartiate marriage market). Enforced clownishness and servility of drunken dancing helots justified as it visualized their marginalization.<sup>3</sup> Authorized inspectors' visual scrutiny was pervasive and unforgiving for the inspected classes (nearly everyone in various age-groups, as Xenophon explains). Magnified surveillance (reminiscent of "big brother watching you" in Orwell's *1984*) pervaded a culture that did not prize literacy or collect paperwork. Rather, the Spartans wished to manipulate spectators and control interpretation of their inhabitants and structures. Visual clues and rules were intended to empower the *homoioi* and disempower teenaged boys (*paidiskoi*) and more suppressed classes and impress foreigners.<sup>4</sup> The ritual flogging of ephebes at Orthia's shrine advertised toughness, whatever its tactile, magico-religious origin in contagious beliefs. Self-scrutiny and self-regard encouraged self-display and visual body-adaptors (scarlet cloaks, staves of authority, short slit skirts) for both internal and external (even enemy) audiences. Naked boys and towns naked of walls suggested invulnerability or advertised unusual self-confidence to foreigners' gaze. The power of images to stimulate sexual, political, ethnocentric, and humorous reactions also invites notice.<sup>5</sup> Representations, for example, of sexual aggression, such as Hamburg's historically inflected "I am Eurymedon" Attic *oinochoe*, combine all these four elicitors of emotions.<sup>6</sup> The body, a sensitive multi-sensory reception center, prioritizes sense impressions of

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. Powell, "Mendacity and Sparta's Use of the Visual," in A. Powell, ed., *Classical Sparta: Techniques behind her Success* (London 1989) 173–192, esp. 188; R. Harman, "Viewing Spartans, Viewing Barbarians," in S. Hodkinson, *Sparta. Comparative Approaches* (Swansea 2009) 361–382 analyzes Xenophon's ethnographies of Persian and Spartan "Others" appearance in Greek eyes.

<sup>4</sup> Ephors were the "overlookers," while boys looked only at their feet (*Lak.Pol.* 3.4-5; cited by Harman, 370).

<sup>5</sup> Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (5.1.4–17) debates the insidious dangers of looking on objects of erotic desire.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., A. G. Mitchell, *Greek Vase-Painting and the Origins of Visual Humour* (Cambridge 2009) 84–86, and A. Lear and E. Cantarella, *Images of Ancient Greek Pederasty* (Routledge 2008) 111–114, for positive and negative visual cues, visual euphemisms, etc. "The Power of Images" refers to Paul Zanker's book (Ann Arbor 1990).

like and unlike bodies before developing its complex emotional, physical, and intellectual responses.

Both titles contribute to series, Toner's to Constance Classen's chronological survey of Western cultures and Squire's to Mark Bradley and Shane Butler's pan-sensorial collection for Classical Antiquity. Both titles inform scholars in other fields that new territories of ancient studies—like social geography, nonverbal behaviors, and food studies—have attracted fruitful exploration. Both provide awareness of interdisciplinary access to familiar ancient issues and they suggest directions for further investigation, such as proprioception and semiotic redundancy. Such expansions of *Altertumswissenschaft* deserve a warm welcome.

DONALD LATEINER

*Ohio Wesleyan University, dglatein@owu.edu*